Pakistan Captures More Senior Afghan Taliban Leaders…But Why?

On the heels of the arrest of Mullah Baradar, The Christian Science Monitor reported yesterday that Pakistan has recently captured an additional seven Taliban leaders, allegedly also part of the Quetta Shura. 

Pakistan has arrested nearly half of the Afghanistan Taliban’s leadership in recent days, Pakistani officials told the Monitor Wednesday, dealing what could be a crucial blow to the insurgent movement.

In total, seven of the insurgent group’s 15-member leadership council, thought to be based in Quetta, Pakistan, including the head of military operations, have been apprehended in the past week, according to Pakistani intelligence officials.

These include: Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir, who oversees the movement’s military affairs, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada, and Mullah Abdul Raouf.

At least two Taliban shadow provincial governors, who are part of the movement’s parallel government in Afghanistan, have also been captured.

The news of these arrests has prompted tremendous speculation about Pakistan’s motives and why the Pakistani’s chose to act now, after turning a blind-eye toward the Afghan Taliban for so many years. 

Before addressing that question, let me back up just a bit. 

One of the main reasons I ended up half-heartedly supporting President Obama’s decision to send additional US troops to Afghanistan was because I thought it would signal an unwavering resolve and commitment toward Afghanistan, which I believed was the only viable short-term measure the US could take that could tip the balance of Pakistan’s strategic calculus away from tacit support for the Afghan Taliban.  Even though it would be much easier to pat myself on the back and argue that the recent string of arrests are a byproduct of the surge, I am highly skeptical that the US surge was a significant factor (or a factor at all) in this shift — if this is indeed a concrete turning point in Pakistan’s policy. 

When Obama announced that he would be sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan and then begin to drawdown in July 2011, Pakistan was overwhelmingly un-impressed and more so concerned that it would drive militants further into its own territory.  Furthermore, the vast majority of additional troops have yet to even arrive in Afghanistan, let alone convincingly demonstrate that their presence will produce more sustainable results. 

So why now?

The dominant theory is that Pakistan decided to take action now because it feared that it may be left out of future negotiations between insurgents, the Afghan government, and international actors.  In other words, Mullah Baradar’s capture was carefully orchestrated in order to ensure Pakistan had a seat at the table.  Yet the bits and pieces of information regarding Baradar’s arrest that subsequently surfaced shattered this argument, as it appears nobody — neither the CIA nor the ISI — knew that they were conducting an operation that would lead to the succesful detainment of such a high-value target.  

Does Protecting Civilians Leave Troops More At-Risk?

Credit: Wired.com

Last year, General Stanley McChrystal, in line with the military’s population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, issued a new directive curtailing the use of air strikes and other tactics that are likely to kill civilians and alienate the population. Yet some view the new rules of engagement as too limiting to troops on the ground — endangering US lives in order to protect Afghan lives. The NY Times published quite the controversial op/ed last Thursday, which argued that the US should not relinquish a key military advantage — air power — in order to save civilian lives.  Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal also published a very good piece on this issue, which I think both acknowledges the NY Times op/ed and also refutes it.

For Capt. Zinni, one of the officers responsible for approving airstrikes in the nine-day-old battle for Marjah, it seemed like an easy call: The men were digging a hole alongside a road where a Marine supply convoy was scheduled to pass within hours. But just as he was about to give the order to strike, Capt. Zinni spotted even-smaller white figures on the video running along the path south of the canal.

Children. Maybe 50 feet from the men planting the booby trap.

That makes for a delicate mission for young officers such as Capt. Zinni, who daily must make instantaneous decisions between action that could save the lives of their fellow Marines and inaction that could save the lives of Afghan civilians. Between winning the battle and losing the war.

Capt. Zinni had seen this scenario before in Marjah. Insurgents using women and children for cover as they moved weapons or crossed open spaces into fighting positions in buildings. In this case, the captain was certain that the children were acting—either by their own volition or under coercion—as shields for the men planting the bomb.

That evening, the scheduled Marine supply convoy rambled down the dirt road. Warned of the booby trap, the vehicles stopped short of the spot where the men were seen digging. The Marines removed a buried triggering device, set to detonate the explosives when a vehicle passed. As is often the case, the Taliban had been working in shifts, with one team responsible for digging the hole and planting the trigger, and another team detailed to bury and connect the homemade explosives.

On Friday, the Marines spotted three men digging on the same road. This time there were no civilians around.

A Marine attack helicopter blasted them with cannon fire.

In certain circumstances, do the new rules of engagement increase the risk for troops? Unfortunately, yes. 

Yet the balance between protecting civilian and military lives is not necessarily a zero-sum game.  The WSJ article paints a perfect picture in which the military prioritized the lives of Afghan civilians – even when there were “certain” they were being used as human shields — and exercised extraordinary restraint.  The Marine convoy that later passed was unharmed by the roadside bomb and was able to dismantle it, as the drone pinpointed the bomb’s exact location and relayed it to the ground.  And insurgents who were closely cooperating with the original bomb layers were subsequently killed.  In the long run, therefore, the restraint paid off and the operation was tactically and strategically successful. 

This operation was emblematic of why popluation-centric COIN — although certainly not without its own flaws by any means– can save Afghan lives while still protecting American troops and, ultimately, wrestle the momentum of the insurgency away from militant’s hands.

A Turning Point in the Afghan Insurgency

The recent capture of Afghan Taliban second-in-command, Mullah Abdul Gani Baradar, potentially signals a seismic shift in the momentum of the Afghan insurgency, providing US and Pakistani officials the opportunity to glean invaluable intelligence.  In the word’s of Peter Bergen, this is a, “huge deal.” Excerpts from the NY Times article:

The Taliban’s top military commander was captured several days ago in Karachi, Pakistan, in a secret joint operation by Pakistani and American intelligence forces, according to American government officials.

The commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, is an Afghan described by American officials as the most significant Taliban figure to be detained since the American-led war in Afghanistan started more than eight years ago. He ranks second in influence only to Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban’s founder and a close associate of Osama bin Laden before the Sept. 11 attacks.

There several implications of this capture that immediately come to mind. 

First, while the US focuses its operations mainly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and generally contends that the senior leadership of the Afghan Taliban resides in Baluchistan Province, the most wanted senior leader next to Mullah Omar turns up in Pakistan’s most populous, metropolitan port city — Karachi.  Other leaders of the Afghan Taliban and even Al Qaeda are more than likely also hiding in Karachi and other highly populated cities in the settled areas of Pakistan (In 2003, Kalid Sheikh Mohammed was captured in Rawalpindi).  Drone strikes — the favored US substitute for a strategy — are out of the question in these areas and both US officials and  militant leaders know it. 

Second, the joint ISI/CIA operation against a senior Afghan Taliban leader could mark the beginning of the much awaited change in Pakistan’s strategic calculus with regard to the Afghan Taliban – that is imperative to successfully countering the insurgency in Afghanistan.  Pakistan was reluctant to even admit that senior Afghan Taliban leaders were operating from Pakistan, let alone take any action against the group, in the past.  Hopefully, this operation sets a new precedent and represents a new era of US-Pakistani cooperation. 

Third, although it may be too early to tell, Baradar’s capture could be the catalyst needed to draw the Taliban leadership into negotiations.  At the very least, Baradar’s capture will provide crucial insight into the Taliban’s current mindset and strategic thinking on a range of issues — including the strength of its relationship with Al Qaeda.

This is truly a pivotal moment and tremendously important capture.

Altering Pakistan’s Strategic Calculus

I want to alert readers of this blog of a discussion taking place on another great blog dedicated to Pakistan issues, Changing Up Pakistan (CHUP). Guest contributor, Tariq Tufail, wrote an interesting  and well-written piece on the blog entitled “The India-Afghanistan-Pakistan Conundrum.”  I’ll let readers peruse his analysis in full because I don’t have room to do it justice in its entirety here.  However, upon reading the article I posed a question to Tariq, which provoked this healthy exchange:

Tariq –

“So unpalatable as it might be, we should recognize the changed international scenario, the harm that we are causing to our population and go for a radical rethink of our Afghan policy and strategy.”

Agree in principle. However, the rethink is radical precisely because it would simultaneously require a rethink of Pakistan’s policy toward India itself.

The overwhelming power and influence the Pakistani national security apparatus wields — not to mention, in many ways, the nationalistic fabric of Pakistan as a state — is predicated on an anti-Indian platform.

So I guess one question is how exactly can we influence a critical mass of the ISI/Army to subscribe to the radical rethink you are suggesting, in the short-term?

Even if the US and the West could foster a viable solution to Kashmir and other issues, it could take many years, do you think the Army/ISI would completely cut off relations with proxies in the interim?

To which, Tariq responded:

Dear Torkham

What you have asked is a difficult question. I have at several times, attempted to answer this, even written a few articles, but have not put them up anywhere because I feel that they are just my opinion and not backed up by any real evidence.

But I tremendously disagree with your characterization of anti-India sentiments on the “Influence the Pakistani national security apparatus”. Yes the influence of the National security apparatus matters in the sense that they have the most visible impact — be it on our politics, nuclear weapons or foreign policy. Sometimes the “national security apparatus” takes over Pakistan by touting the Anti-India angle (what was the reason for Zia and Musharraf Coup again?)

But that is not the only factor (or even a factor at all). If you purely consider “national security” from a overt aggression angle — I doubt India is going to invade us any time soon, we have the bomb and are crazy enough to use it. If you consider “national security” from a covert aggression angle, I feel that India would be more than willing to strike a bargain of not supporting covert groups against each other.

Anti-India sentiment in Pakistan does not arise from a purely “national security” standpoint.

An Urge to avenge ‘71, a desire to ensure our food security by controlling water (in Kashmir), the spirit of Ghazwa-e-hind, subtle propaganda through media and school textbooks so much that we forget why specifically we hate India are all reasons, sometimes reasons which are more important than even our perception of “national security”.

I wanted to add to my response that what I am talking about is not Indo-Pak friendship — that will probably take a generation or more.

What I am talking about is more narrow: A realization, at this point in time, that our pursuit of “advantage” against India should not be so all consuming to put our very existence under threat.

We should make a series of decisions, (which as a side effect may or may not benefit India, that is immaterial), which leads us on the right path of less violence, just legal system, a functioning country where people feel empowered, more economic prospects and more domestic and international peace.

This I think can be pursued by abandoning “Lets one up India tomorrow” as the central tenet of our policy and adopting “lets strengthen Pakistan tomorrow” as a central policy.

People in Pakistan confuse the latter for the former. Maybe they just want the former and not the latter.

My response to Tariq is this. 

Breaking Up (with Al Qaeda) is Hard to Do

For a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan to succeed, everyone knows Pakistan’s full and unwavering support is imperative.  In today’s NY Times, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, reportedly conveyed Pakistan’s willingness to foster meaningful negotiations that could eventually bring an end to the cycle of violence haunting Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

NY Times reporter Jane Perlez particularly underscores Pakistan’s long-time relationship with one strand of the multi-pronged insurgency, the Haqqani network.  The Haqqani network is definitely a potent group with substantial influence in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and therefore dissuading the group from violence would be a huge blow to the insurgency. 

Once again, however, it seems like the terms of the negotiations will render them futile and meaningless:

One strand of thinking within the Obama administration calls for allowing the Pakistanis to keep the Haqqanis as part of Pakistan’s sphere of influence in southern Afghanistan, but only if Pakistan forces the Haqqanis to break with Al Qaeda and to push militants out of its areas, an American official said.

That would be a tall order for Pakistan, Mr. Hussain said. “The question is, how much influence do we have over Haqqani?” he said. “We have influence but not controlling influence.”

According to a Pakistani military official, the Pakistanis would first have to resolve where Qaeda fighters would go and whether they might be given safe passage to Yemen or another location.

First, the Haqqanis have maintained deeply rooted ties to senior Al Qaeda members dating back to the Soviet-Afghan War.  The groups are more than just allies of convenience now, they have cultivated a much more meaningful kinship.  But, even if the Haqqanis were willing to break up with Al Qaeda, it still seems far-fetched to believe they would be able to enforce it upon themselves and their entire network in any sustainable way. 

If you had close friends of the family whom you trusted and cared about for three decades or more, would you be able to cut all ties instantaneously — forever?  And furthermore, would you be willing and able to fight and kill your one-time friends if they tried to make contact or stop by for a visit?

Second, the fact that an unnamed Pakistani official even entertained the idea — and believed that the US would be anything but irate – at a plan to channel Al Qaeda fighters outside of Pakistan and give them safe passage to Yemen or elsewhere is, quite frankly, laughable.  It is also mind-boggling to think that Pakistan would ever think that was a productive solution. 

I am not sure how exactly the US can divorce and uproot Al Qaeda from the multitude of marriages it has entered into (many times, literally) with various militant groups over the years.  However, one thing to keep in mind is, groups such as the Haqqanis or Quetta  Shura not only have to be willing — which is indeed a “tall order” in and of itself — they also have to be able to sustainably cut all ties with their Arab brothers.

Good Riddance Hakimullah

After much speculation, it appears as though the Pakistani Taliban is finally ready to admit that its callous leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, died from wounds sustained through a US drone strike sometime in January (exactly which strike hit Mehsud is still unclear). 

Mehsud’s death comes on the heels of the attack on a CIA facility in Khost, Afghanistan  in which nine people were killed and 6 others wounded.  Hakimullah’s death also comes approximately five months after his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud was also killed by a drone strike.  The decapitation of the Taliban’s leadership in a relatively short period of time is a substantial setback for the Pakistani Taliban, which is also weakened from recent battles with the Pakistan Army. 

The CIA most definitely must be celebrating. 

Not to take anything away from this exceptional tactical success, but as I was having a conversation about the attack in Khost and the subsequent barrage of drone strikes with a colleague of mine (a Marine who has spent considerable time in Afghanistan and was also later involved in targeting high-value militants for the CIA) he raised an interesting question: 

According to him, the sudden uptick in drone strikes immediately following the suicide bombing in Khost suggests that the CIA and/or ISI had actionable intelligence (or, at least sources that could provide such intellligence) on high-value targets — such as Hakimullah Mehsud — even before the December 30th tragedy.  In his view, the CIA  reacted to the murder of some if its finest by targeting key leaders like Mehsud – who was seen alongside the suicide bomber al-Balawi in a subsequent video — instead of proactively going after these individuals.  In other words, he wonders how if Mehsud proved so elusive in the five month period between his accession to leadership of Tehrik-e-Taliban and the Khost attack, the necessary intelligence quickly materialize literally just weeks after the attack?

I don’t necessarily subscribe to his cynical view as there could be plenty of other explanations for the quick turn-around — including pure luck — but I thought it was an interesting point to ponder.   In any case, good riddance, Hakimullah. 

Credit: Reuters

The Roots of Pakistani Rage

Over at Changing Up Pakistan (CHUP), a reader named Tariq’s comments on a post on Blackwater (now Xe) amused me so much that I feel compelled to post it in full.

The question of whether Blackwater is operating in Pakistan is just peripheral. I feel that this is just another example of what we do best: Manufacture outrage to deflect the anger from our Politicians and Army who allowed them in through official channels in the first place and act all self righteous as though we are the victims.

Let me give you an example. There is a huge media outrage about drone attacks. With words like “Sovereignty” “Murder” “Innocent civilians” frequently thrown about. Except for a slight inconvenience: US Senate Intelligence Committee chair, Diane Feinstein is on record during a hearing, stating “as I understand it, these [drones] are flown out of a Pakistani base.”

Our response? Defence Minister Ahmad Mukhtar comes out saying “We do have the facilities from where they can fly, but they are not being flown from Pakistani territory.” and the Prize Winning statements

“Drones have been allowed to land in Pakistan only for logistical reasons”

and

“Drones can land but not take off” (I wonder what they do after landing. Walk over to Afghanistan?).

There are pictures on google earth for your viewing pleasure (at the end of this comment) of Predator drones parked in Shamsi airbase, so our armed forces are not so innocent either.

The conclusion is unmistakable. In exchange for money (and whatever else I dont know), drones are being flown from Pakistan!! Then why all this media anger and statements about “Sovereignty” from everyone from TV anchors to the COAS?

Lets move on to Blackwater. As you correctly point out first there was a denial that it was operating in Pakistan (which could only be described politely as a “fat lie”. I know more choice words in urdu). Then the truth comes tumbling out from Gates. How much do you want to bet that Blackwater is in Pakistan with official approval from the highest levels of Pakistani government and armed forces?

With due respect to Mosharraf Zaidi (an excellent writer), who finds it odd that “Objecting to a mercenary for-profit war company operating without accountability in Pakistan should be controversial”, The debate is not controversial at all. The only debate in my own mind is whether we have the right to object to a mercenary for-profit war company if (a) we invited them (b) we hired them or most likely (c) we took money from the US for letting them operate in Pakistan.

Lets first find out what we are upto before lining up to blame the “mercenaries”.

If only the trajectory in the percentage of people who thought similarly to Tariq was increasing.  Unfortunately, much to the West and the entire region’s chagrin, it is not.

At the same time, I guess we must also be careful what we wish for.  If Pakistanis, instead of largely directing their outrage toward the US, India, and Israel, honed in on the Pakistani government itself, the ensuing instability could make the chaos that is occurring in the country now look like the golden age.

Would Mullah Omar Negotiate? Part III

Not just another pretty face

While the US is not quite ready or willing to negotiate with the Taliban leadership, the Karzai administration seems determined to continue fostering the necessary environment for such talks.  The Washington Post published an article today that highlights this deepening fissure:

U.S. officials prefer to focus on low-level fighters while hoping that an additional 30,000 troops can pummel the Taliban into a weaker negotiating position. Karzai’s government, on the other hand, has stressed the need to reach out to the Islamist movement’s leadership. Karzai spent Wednesday in Saudi Arabia seeking the kingdom’s help in encouraging Taliban representatives to attend an upcoming conference in Kabul, according to a senior Afghan official.

The details of the Afghan government’s reconciliation strategy have not been worked out, but Karzai laid out the principles at an international conference in London last week. Among its conditions for negotiation, the Afghan government wants Taliban members to renounce violence, sever ties with al-Qaeda and respect the constitution.

Former Taliban officials said any U.S.-backed effort to entice lower-level Taliban fighters was a waste of time and money. The only path to ending the war, they said, lies in negotiating with the movement’s leadership.

Zaeef and other former Taliban officials disagree with the popular notion among U.S. and NATO officials that the vast majority of Taliban fighters join the insurgency because they want money, protection or status.

“This is an ideological war,” Zaeef said. “When a person is coming to Kabul and fighting inside Kabul, he can be sure he will not survive. He will be killed here. This is not about money.”

The Asia Times also ran an interesting article on the subject:

The current source of tension is Karzai’s proposal, first made last November, to invite Taliban leaders – including Mullah Omar – to a national loya jirga or grand council meeting aimed at achieving a peace agreement.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded by pressing Karzai to demand far-reaching concessions from the Taliban in advance of the meeting. Clinton’s conditions on Taliban participation included renunciation of al-Qaeda and of violence and acceptance of the Afghan constitution, conditions that would make it impossible for leaders of the insurgency to agree to if they are interpreted literally.

But Karzai announced at the London conference that he would invite the leadership of the Taliban to a loya jirga without specifying that they would have to meet specific conditions in advance of the meeting.

Significantly, the Taliban spokesman did not dismiss Karzai’s invitation out of hand, as might have been expected, but announced that the Taliban would make a decision “soon” on attending the conference.

Here is my two-cents on the subject. 

I am not totally convinced the Commander of the Faithful, Mullah Omar, will openly negotiate and/or publicly renounce Al Qaeda.  However, there are at least some indications from his own statements hinting at the prospect that he might — and the US should not dismiss this possibility outright purely out of political concerns.  Furthermore, it does appear more likely that other insurgent leaders, such as Haqqani and Hekmatyar, could accept negotiations with the Karzai government if the environment and circumstances were right.  As a result, the US and Karzai should do everything possible to create wedges between the different factions and induce some of the senior leaders to start constructive talks. 

The problem is, both sides are insisting on impossible preconditions for the other side to accept from the outset.  The Taliban’s ostensible demand is for all foreign troops to withdraw before negotiations can commence.  The US rejects even the notion of negotiations with the Taliban’s senior leadership until it pledges to cut ties with Al Qaeda and renounce all violence.  If both sides are unwilling to talk without these preconditions met, there will will not be meaningful negotiations — now or in the future. 

From the US point of view, negotiating at this point would be counterproductive because the Taliban believes they are winning.  True enough.  But even if by July 2011 the momentum swings into the international community’s favor, it does not automatically mean the Taliban will be significantly more interested in throwing in the towel.  It is important to remember, the Taliban believes it is already ahead of schedule in regaining power in Afghanistan and therefore it may perceive a change in momentum as a temporary setback that it can overcome.  Whether they are winning or losing at a particular moment in time is probably only one (relatively unimportant) factor that is overshadowed by the senior leadership’s largely genuine belief in a divinely ordained mandate, which ensures success no matter how long it takes.

That being said, “success” may mean the Taliban leadership will not rest until it recaptures and establishes its brutal rule over all of Afghanistan.  Or, after 9 years of fighting and disillusionment amongst the vast majority of Afghans, it may mean something else.  And it seems like the only way to really find out for sure is…to talk.

Testing the $10 Taliban Theory: Part II

Besides negotiations, the international community seems poised to increase efforts and channel more resources toward essentially buying off low-level Taliban fighters in hopes of drying up the Taliban’s ranks substantially and rapidly.  Partly with this same goal in mind, the salary of Afghan Army soldiers was also increased in order to offset the financial allure of joining the Taliban over the government.  I was skeptical that the plan would work (thus far, it doesn’t seem like it has, although I am not completely sure the salary increase has been fully implemented) and for similar reasons am also not sold on the idea that any meaningful number of Taliban foot soldiers will capitalize on the international community’s plan to provide monetary incentives to defect from the movement. 

Ron Moreau recently published an article on this topic in Newsweek that echoes some of my qualms with the plan:

Others at the conference had what they evidently considered more realistic solutions—such as paying Taliban fighters to quit the insurgency. Participants reportedly pledged some $500 million to support that aim.

If the leadership, commanders, and subcommanders wanted comfortable lives, he says, they would have made their deals long ago. Instead they stayed committed to their cause even when they were on the run, with barely a hope of survival. Now they’re back in action across much of the south, east, and west, the provinces surrounding Kabul, and chunks of the north. They used to hope they might reach this point in 15 or 20 years. They’ve done it in eight. Many of them see this as proof that God is indeed on their side.

Only a few relatively low-level Taliban commanders and fighters have defected, and they rue the day they did. Most of them now live hand-to-mouth in Kabul, exiled from their home villages. Sami has introduced me to some of them. They only wish they could return to the embrace of Haqqani or Mullah Baradar, the Taliban’s No. 2 leader after Mullah Mohammed Omar, but they know they’d be killed if they were foolish enough to try. The Taliban don’t give second chances. Even if Karzai and his U.S.-NATO allies offer great gobs of money to defecting Taliban, where could they go with it? They couldn’t go home for fear of being put to death by their former comrades in arms. They wouldn’t want to live in expensive Kabul, where people on the streets would make fun of their country ways, huge black turbans, and kohl eyeliner. They hate everything that Kabul represents: a sinful place of coed schools, dancing, drinking, music, movies, prostitution, and the accumulation of wealth.

To elaborate, I believe the plan is predicated on a few false assumptions of reality. 

First, to think that the majority or even a significant portion of Taliban foot soldiers are motivated only by financial considerations would be a mistake.  I don’t disagree that the need for a decent income and employment — even if the job is to lay roadside bombs — is paramount for many of the low-level insurgents.  However, more likely than not there are several other factors simultaneously intermixing that drive many into the arms of the Taliban.  Some of these factors may include local grievances, tribal conflicts, or the mystique and honor associated with becoming a warrior.  It seems too simplistic to think that flashing money at these foot soldiers will somehow eliminate or render the other factors meaningless.

Second, for many Western officials, the emphasis on financial considerations somehow necessarily implies that ideological considerations are unimportant or tangential.  In other words, many seem to think that if a foot soldier is driven – at least in part — by money, he probably doesn’t think of the struggle in ideological terms.  I would question this assumption and argue that many fighters can be motivated by both ideological support for the Taliban’s stated goals and aims (although they do not have to be as “hard core” as the leadership or subscribe entirely to Taliban dogma) and the desire to make a living for their families. 

As such, I am not so sure the international community will see much return on their seemingly attractive $500 million dollar investment.  Again, I hope I am wrong.

Credit: Wired.com