Would Mullah Omar Negotiate? Part III

Not just another pretty face

While the US is not quite ready or willing to negotiate with the Taliban leadership, the Karzai administration seems determined to continue fostering the necessary environment for such talks.  The Washington Post published an article today that highlights this deepening fissure:

U.S. officials prefer to focus on low-level fighters while hoping that an additional 30,000 troops can pummel the Taliban into a weaker negotiating position. Karzai’s government, on the other hand, has stressed the need to reach out to the Islamist movement’s leadership. Karzai spent Wednesday in Saudi Arabia seeking the kingdom’s help in encouraging Taliban representatives to attend an upcoming conference in Kabul, according to a senior Afghan official.

The details of the Afghan government’s reconciliation strategy have not been worked out, but Karzai laid out the principles at an international conference in London last week. Among its conditions for negotiation, the Afghan government wants Taliban members to renounce violence, sever ties with al-Qaeda and respect the constitution.

Former Taliban officials said any U.S.-backed effort to entice lower-level Taliban fighters was a waste of time and money. The only path to ending the war, they said, lies in negotiating with the movement’s leadership.

Zaeef and other former Taliban officials disagree with the popular notion among U.S. and NATO officials that the vast majority of Taliban fighters join the insurgency because they want money, protection or status.

“This is an ideological war,” Zaeef said. “When a person is coming to Kabul and fighting inside Kabul, he can be sure he will not survive. He will be killed here. This is not about money.”

The Asia Times also ran an interesting article on the subject:

The current source of tension is Karzai’s proposal, first made last November, to invite Taliban leaders – including Mullah Omar – to a national loya jirga or grand council meeting aimed at achieving a peace agreement.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton responded by pressing Karzai to demand far-reaching concessions from the Taliban in advance of the meeting. Clinton’s conditions on Taliban participation included renunciation of al-Qaeda and of violence and acceptance of the Afghan constitution, conditions that would make it impossible for leaders of the insurgency to agree to if they are interpreted literally.

But Karzai announced at the London conference that he would invite the leadership of the Taliban to a loya jirga without specifying that they would have to meet specific conditions in advance of the meeting.

Significantly, the Taliban spokesman did not dismiss Karzai’s invitation out of hand, as might have been expected, but announced that the Taliban would make a decision “soon” on attending the conference.

Here is my two-cents on the subject. 

I am not totally convinced the Commander of the Faithful, Mullah Omar, will openly negotiate and/or publicly renounce Al Qaeda.  However, there are at least some indications from his own statements hinting at the prospect that he might — and the US should not dismiss this possibility outright purely out of political concerns.  Furthermore, it does appear more likely that other insurgent leaders, such as Haqqani and Hekmatyar, could accept negotiations with the Karzai government if the environment and circumstances were right.  As a result, the US and Karzai should do everything possible to create wedges between the different factions and induce some of the senior leaders to start constructive talks. 

The problem is, both sides are insisting on impossible preconditions for the other side to accept from the outset.  The Taliban’s ostensible demand is for all foreign troops to withdraw before negotiations can commence.  The US rejects even the notion of negotiations with the Taliban’s senior leadership until it pledges to cut ties with Al Qaeda and renounce all violence.  If both sides are unwilling to talk without these preconditions met, there will will not be meaningful negotiations — now or in the future. 

From the US point of view, negotiating at this point would be counterproductive because the Taliban believes they are winning.  True enough.  But even if by July 2011 the momentum swings into the international community’s favor, it does not automatically mean the Taliban will be significantly more interested in throwing in the towel.  It is important to remember, the Taliban believes it is already ahead of schedule in regaining power in Afghanistan and therefore it may perceive a change in momentum as a temporary setback that it can overcome.  Whether they are winning or losing at a particular moment in time is probably only one (relatively unimportant) factor that is overshadowed by the senior leadership’s largely genuine belief in a divinely ordained mandate, which ensures success no matter how long it takes.

That being said, “success” may mean the Taliban leadership will not rest until it recaptures and establishes its brutal rule over all of Afghanistan.  Or, after 9 years of fighting and disillusionment amongst the vast majority of Afghans, it may mean something else.  And it seems like the only way to really find out for sure is…to talk.