Breaking Up (with Al Qaeda) is Hard to Do

For a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan to succeed, everyone knows Pakistan’s full and unwavering support is imperative.  In today’s NY Times, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, reportedly conveyed Pakistan’s willingness to foster meaningful negotiations that could eventually bring an end to the cycle of violence haunting Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

NY Times reporter Jane Perlez particularly underscores Pakistan’s long-time relationship with one strand of the multi-pronged insurgency, the Haqqani network.  The Haqqani network is definitely a potent group with substantial influence in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and therefore dissuading the group from violence would be a huge blow to the insurgency. 

Once again, however, it seems like the terms of the negotiations will render them futile and meaningless:

One strand of thinking within the Obama administration calls for allowing the Pakistanis to keep the Haqqanis as part of Pakistan’s sphere of influence in southern Afghanistan, but only if Pakistan forces the Haqqanis to break with Al Qaeda and to push militants out of its areas, an American official said.

That would be a tall order for Pakistan, Mr. Hussain said. “The question is, how much influence do we have over Haqqani?” he said. “We have influence but not controlling influence.”

According to a Pakistani military official, the Pakistanis would first have to resolve where Qaeda fighters would go and whether they might be given safe passage to Yemen or another location.

First, the Haqqanis have maintained deeply rooted ties to senior Al Qaeda members dating back to the Soviet-Afghan War.  The groups are more than just allies of convenience now, they have cultivated a much more meaningful kinship.  But, even if the Haqqanis were willing to break up with Al Qaeda, it still seems far-fetched to believe they would be able to enforce it upon themselves and their entire network in any sustainable way. 

If you had close friends of the family whom you trusted and cared about for three decades or more, would you be able to cut all ties instantaneously — forever?  And furthermore, would you be willing and able to fight and kill your one-time friends if they tried to make contact or stop by for a visit?

Second, the fact that an unnamed Pakistani official even entertained the idea — and believed that the US would be anything but irate – at a plan to channel Al Qaeda fighters outside of Pakistan and give them safe passage to Yemen or elsewhere is, quite frankly, laughable.  It is also mind-boggling to think that Pakistan would ever think that was a productive solution. 

I am not sure how exactly the US can divorce and uproot Al Qaeda from the multitude of marriages it has entered into (many times, literally) with various militant groups over the years.  However, one thing to keep in mind is, groups such as the Haqqanis or Quetta  Shura not only have to be willing — which is indeed a “tall order” in and of itself — they also have to be able to sustainably cut all ties with their Arab brothers.

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One Response to Breaking Up (with Al Qaeda) is Hard to Do

  1. [...] Pakistan Army.  On the other hand, the gaping hole in all of this is whether any of the groups, especially the Haqqanis, can credibly promise to disavow Al Qaeda forever.  If they probably cannot, at least for [...]

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