Acknowledging the Not-So-Covert CIA Drone Program

Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedmann of the New America Foundation published an interesting Op/Ed a couple days ago in the NY Times.  They argued that the CIA should come clean about its drone program, as it is already the ” world’s worst kept secret”.  Indeed, if the point of covert operations is to maintain a degree of plausible deniability, the CIA’s program has almost none. 

While I don’t necessarily have a problem with acknowledging the program, I was far from satisfied with Bergen and Tiedmann’s rationale:

But there are good reasons for the United States, which conducted 53 such strikes in 2009 alone, and Pakistan to finally acknowledge the existence of the drone program.

First, there is the matter of Pakistani civilian casualties caused by the drones. In a poll last summer, only 9 percent of Pakistanis approved of the drone strikes. A key reason for this unpopularity is the widespread perception that the strikes overwhelmingly kill civilians.

Should the American government’s claims about the small number of civilian deaths be verified, some of the Pakistani hostility toward the United States might dissipate. This would be much easier if the now-classified videotapes of drone strikes were made available to independent researchers.

True, de-classifying video tapes of drone strikes would be like Christmas for independent researchers, but I am not so sure it would significantly diminish hostility toward the US.  As documented recently with the release of the Iraq video by WikiLeaks, even if the video showed 2 civilians were killed and not 10, the powerful and visceral reactions such a video would evoke are more than enough to spark outrage and possible violence.  In short, perceptions and emotions matter much more than accurate numbers.  I can guarantee you the tribe, subtribe, and allies of a civilian victim will not care one bit if the US government was correct in their estimation of civilian casualties — and neither will many mainstream Pakistanis (and the rest of the world) who gain full access to the assassinations on their laptops. 

Acknowledging the drone program would also help advance our efforts — and improve our profile — in the region by providing an excellent example of the deepening United States-Pakistan strategic partnership. Since January 2009, up to 85 reported drone strikes have killed militants who are responsible for the deaths of thousands of Pakistanis. A good deal of the intelligence that enables these strikes comes from the Pakistanis themselves.

I am just confused by this argument.  When the Kerry-Lugar Bill was “debated” in Pakistan, there was massive outrage.  Many Pakistanis were angry that the US was giving aid to Pakistan because it was perceived as an affront to Pakistani sovereignty.  But somehow Pakistanis will celebrate a “deepening” US-Pakistani partnership that consists of using alien-like technology to kill militants and sometimes innocent civilians? 

Many Pakistanis already see the US-Pakistani relationship as too close for comfort, and using drones as the centerpiece of a strengthening partnership is not likely to do anything but further agitate the public. 

Pakistanis now believe that battling the militants is in the country’s own interest. As a result, over the past year, the public’s support for the Pakistani Army’s efforts in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan has surged. If Pakistan came clean about its involvement with the drones, public backing for the program might similarly increase.

This argument just over-simplifies  a little too much.  Pakistanis have been supportive of operations against the TTP and other militant groups that attack the state and terrorize the public.  After a much delayed response, the public and the government took ownership and responsibility of the issue and the Army has made some gains against militants with substantial public-backing.  Where does the US fit into all of this?  For the Pakistani public, nowhere.  And that’s how they like it. 

Sure, no one is going to complain if a US drone takes out Pakistani menace’s to society, Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud.  However, as soon as you go public with the drone program and emphasize a close partnership between the US and Pakistan against the militants, you are likely to undermine public support, increase propoganda potential for the enemy, and taint the entire effort as America’s war. 

Of course, by acknowledging the drone strikes, the Obama administration would also have to admit that civilians are sometimes killed in these attacks. When Afghan civilians are killed by American forces, their families are often compensated by the United States. Surely, the families of Pakistani civilians killed in American drone strikes deserve the same

 

This is perhaps the strongest reason the author’s had, in my opinion.  But do you really need to go public in order to compensate the families? I am not sure why that would be the only way, but I may be missing something. 

Baradar’s Capture Sparks Power Struggle

There has been much debate surrounding the implications of Mullah Baradar’s arrest in Karachi this past February.  Some argue that even when other senior leaders were caught or killed in the past, such as Mullah Dadullah, it had little or no impact on the Taliban.  Others are convinced that Baradar’s arrest is the beginning of a momentum shift in favor of the coalition forces. 

Today, The Times ran an article that depicts high-level discord in the Taliban ranks, directly fomented by Baradar’s capture. 

Two of the Taleban’s most senior military commanders are involved in a bitter power struggle, which insiders claim has split the insurgents’ leadership council and could turn violent in parts of southern Afghanistan.

Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir and Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor were both named as the successors to Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taleban’s second in command, who was arrested in Pakistan in February.

Fighters loyal to Mullah Baradar have been forced to take sides, after his arrest in Karachi. Haji Sar Mualem, the deputy head of the Marjah community shura, said that relatives told him about the tensions. “There are problems between Zakir and Mansoor,” he said. “Each of them says ‘I am the commander in Helmand’ .” Both men have supporters in Helmand, but sources said that Mullah Mansoor was trying to flood the province with fighters from his own tribe to wrest control from his rival. “He sent his soldiers to every district,” one said. “There wasn’t any fighting but it created tension.”

It would be hasty to put too much emphasis on this alleged tension within the highest echelons of the Taliban leadership, as the internal dissidence is likely to be short-lived.  Still, creating, deepening, or exploiting divisions within the enemy’s organization is definitely a positive sign — even if it is ephemeral. 

The disagreement between two senior leaders also implies that the Taliban leadership is neither uniformly nor invariably driven by ideology — power and prestige can also be a factor.  If your only goal is to expel the infidel invaders — and not gain anything personally — why bicker with your own brothers?

Furthermore, if these tensions are real and not overblown, it also says something about Mullah Omar’s authority and command and control over the group.  Either Omar was not abundantly clear about who would lead the military operations, which implies that the communication channels are poor or Omar is not an effective communicator.  Or, Omar was decisive and direct about the orders but Zakir and Mansoor are not implementing the orders correctly. 

Any way you spin it, it doesn’t look great for Taliban unity to be in potential disarray at such a critical juncture in the insurgency, which is good news for the US and its allies.

Drones and the Osama “Myth”

First of all, I apologize again for the hiatus from posting.

Yesterday, an article in the Pakistani newspaper, The Dawn, caught my attention.  Readers of this blog know I have pretty strong opinions about drone strikes and their long-term efficacy.  But in this article, I found myself defending the program. 

The fixation on Bin Laden’s capture has in fact become the cornerstone of US counter-terrorism strategy. Whether it is Predator drone attacks or targeted killings, the underlying assumption is that eliminating the leadership of Al Qaeda and the Taliban is the recipe to ridding the region of terrorist activity and achieving a victory for the United States.

To add to the saga of dwindling terrorist masterminds, the capture of a host of Al Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan leaders by Pakistani security forces has been lauded by the US as signs of crucial progress in the effort to defeat, disrupt and dismantle Al Qaeda.

The objections of defence analysts in Pakistan and elsewhere who have tried to draw attention to the possibility that simply killing the seemingly endless stream of supposed leaders may not be an effective extermination strategy has largely fallen on deaf ears among those intent on quantifying success by counting the heads of dead Al Qaeda and Taliban members.

A recent study cited in a New York Times article by Robert Wright posed this very question, and found that “leadership decapitation” is a dubious strategy at best. According to the study, published by the journal Security Studies, elimination of leaders in “religious-based” organisations such as Al Qaeda was only 17 per cent effective in actually causing the collapse of the organisation. Particularly notable is the fact that if nothing was done, the chances of the group just fading away increase to about 33 per cent.

Thus facilitated by the Osama myth, Pakistan and America’s stagnant military organisations continue to believe that the hunt, kill or capture method will eliminate the enemy. In the meantime, the organisations continue to replenish their ranks with new recruits, creating scores of new leaders to replace old ones as new Osamas and Baitullahs continue to evolve.

Zakaria makes a number of incorrect assertions about what the drone program is about and why it is perceived to be so effective. 

First, Zakaria contends that killing or capturing Osama bin Laden is the cornerstone of US counterterrorism strategy.  At best, this is debatable.  Although it is no doubt very high on the priority list, the vast majority of experts and officials involved are well aware that killing or capturing bin Laden will not mean the end of Al Qaeda.  Even experts who place greater importance on bin Laden’s influence today, such as Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, fully understand that his demise — although a tremendous blow to the organization — would not destroy the group or its ideological virus. 

Second, Zakaria asserts that successful hits on key leaders of the Pakistani Taliban or Al Qaeda are essentially meaningless.  I agree that most of the time leaders can be replaced and the organization is only temporarily shaken.  Still, although the drone strikes against leaders do little to dismantle or defeat the enemy, they do have disruptive capability.  The strikes have led to significant intra-group suspicion and forced many militants to hide in fear of being targeted.  In short, they do play some role — although a limited and short-term one — in countering terrorist groups operating in the region. 

Zakarai does, however, cite an interesting study that I admit I have not yet read.  Hopefully, I can obtain a copy of the publication and write a follow-up post outlining my thoughts on the study’s implications.

Apologize to Readers

I have been swamped this week at work and have not had time to update the blog, very sorry! I will do my best to write ASAP and will make up for my silence this week with more frequent posts when I get some more breathing space. 

Thanks!

Clear Path Out of Afghanistan?

Dr. Bernard Finel wrote a thought-provoking new piece for Foreign Affairs.  Finel often brings pragmatism and fresh analysis to  over-saturated and one-sided debates on a variety of issues, especially Afghanistan. 

He believes the US must alter its COIN approach, which would ultimately force insurgents to re-calculate their will to keep fighting and pave the way for a negotiated, compromised peace-plan.  Excerpts from the article, published today:

On the other hand, a robust enemy-centric COIN campaign to eliminate insurgent strongholds and reduce their combat power would make an insurgent victory unlikely. Once both the insurgents and NATO forces acknowledge this reality, they will be left to haggle over the details of what comes next.

To convince senior insurgent leaders to compromise, Washington will have to keep consistent pressure on insurgent strongholds.

The logic of an enemy-centric COIN campaign is not to hold territory but to demonstrate that the insurgents cannot hold territory either.

I whole-heartedly agree with the emphasis on inducing formal negotiations and acknowledging that their must be some kind of a compromise.  There will be no unconditional surrenders.  I am not convinced, however, that an enemy-centric COIN strategy will foster the conditions necessary or sufficiently break the insurgent’s will to keep fighting. 

First, an underlying assumption is that the insurgents actually believe they can hold contested territory in the first place.  In several instances, NATO operations into insurgent strongholds have led to the militants simply scattering, far from putting up the type of fight one would expect from a group that thinks it can withstand the onslaught.  I think the insurgents already know it’s extremely difficult from them to hold territory when it is actually contested.  Thus, they often choose to withdraw and move to another area — only to return if and when international forces fail to hold the territory they were displaced from.  In other words, further demonstrating to insurgent’s that they cannot hold territory does not seem like it would yield a fundamentally different strategic calculation if they are indeed fully aware of that fact already. 

Second, Finel does not explain how exactly this enemy-centric strategy would play out operationally.  To me, it sounds like a giant wack-a-mole strategy in which international troops sweep through one insurgent stronghold — possibly resulting in significant collateral damage that perpetuates more violence  – and then proceed to the next insurgent stronghold, leaving the one they just cleared open for re-infiltration.  Sure, the insurgents might get tired of trying to establish themselves in key strategic areas if they keep getting kicked out, but our troops will likely be just as tired of playing cat and mouse.  More importantly, the people of theses areas will be the real victims. 

Admittedly, as Finel mentions, McChrystal may be advocating a population-centric approach yet is equally concentrating on going after the enemy in areas where its influence is the greatest.  I don’t see a problem or contradiction with that. 

Where I see a potential issue is if our troops fail to hold any of the territory they capture, allowing insurgents to return and repeating the cycle endlessly. 

Finally, if the goal is to encourage a negotiated solution, it’s not clear that we need to shift our strategy at all.  Already — and apparently as far back as two-plus years ago — there is mounting evidence that senior leaders of the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami are and have been responding to overtures from the Afghan government and the UN.  Consequently, it may be more appropriate for the US not to change its military strategy, but to alter its mindset about the efficacy of negotiations with leaders of the insurgency.

Drone Strikes Force Al Qaeda to Give Up Luxuries

Yet another NY Times article trumpeting the effectiveness of drone strikes in Pakistan was published yesterday, underscoring just how in infatuated some reporters and analysts are with the strikes.  Excerpts from the Times:

The strikes have cast a pall of fear over an area that was once a free zone for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, forcing militants to abandon satellite phones and large gatherings in favor of communicating by courier and moving stealthily in small groups, they said.

Militants now sneak into villages two at a time to sleep, he said. Some homeowners were refusing to rent space to Arabs, who are associated with Al Qaeda, for fear of their families’ being killed by the drones, he said.

The militants have abandoned all-terrain vehicles in favor of humdrum public transportation, one of the government supporters said.

The army maintains a division of soldiers in North Waziristan, but, the militant said, the Pakistani soldiers do little to hinder militant operations, which, though under greater pressure from the drones, have by no means stopped.

Indeed, relentless pressure from drone strikes have ensured that militants in the Tribal Areas cannot pre-order the new iPhone.  And thus, we are winning.

Communicating via courier and moving “stealthily” in small groups may sound painfully extreme to the average American, but these militants are operating in a society in which the standard of living and atmosphere are more comparable to 1810, not 2010.  Sure, they would love to use satellite phones and drive around Miramshah in the sleakest 1989 Toyota 4 x 4 on the block, but these are luxuries and not necessarily necessities for Al Qaeda to sufficiently operate.

Sure, hampering Al Qaeda’s communication channels and thereby slowing the flow of their information networks is very important.  If the strikes are assisting in that, that is a great sign.  Furthermore, if the strikes are sowing fear and insecurity within and between militant groups and support networks, that is also excellent news.

But Al Qaeda still continues on with its core functions, despite the heavy onslaught by drones.  The pace of successful strikes against Al Qaeda leaders is still slower than necessary to significantly undermine its ability to replace fallen militants and maintain a solid chain of command.  In other words, Al Qaeda, while admittedly under substantial pressure, has simply adapted and modified the manner in which it executes its core functions — but they have not ceased.

It’s a much more dangerous environment for Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.  But to put this in some context, Al Qaeda had been operating (albeit cautiously and surreptitiously) from 2001 until just a few years ago with near impunity, except for sporadic operations by Pakistan.  Al Qaeda militants were gradually re-grouping and increasing strength for several years and now they must hide.  That is certainly progress, no doubt about that.

However, a key issue is something that was only mentioned as an aside in the article: Pakistan’s Army has a division stationed in North Waziristan and militants don’t seem to be the slightest bit afraid.  Couple the strikes with a broader counterterrorism strategy in North Waziristan, and the results will drastically overshadow current successes.   But without a more comprehensive approach, Al Qaeda will continue to plan, plot, and execute.

Sensibility Replaces Expediency in New Aviation Security Policy

Readers of this blog may remember my criticism of the Obama administration’s ill-conceived aviation security “reform”, which was a knee-jerk reaction sparked by the underwear bomber’s Christmas Day bombing attempt. 

Yesterday, the NY Times reported that the administration is replacing the deeply flawed, strategically counterproductive policy with a much more nuanced, intelligence-driven approach. 

The new approach will replace a broader layer of extra scrutiny that had been imposed recently on all passengers from 14 countries, most of which are Muslim.

It’s much more tailored to what intelligence is telling us and what the threat is telling us, as opposed to stopping all individuals from a particular nationality or all individuals using a particular passport,” the administration official said Thursday, speaking on the condition of anonymity in advance of the formal announcement.

For the last three months, thousands of people flying to the United States each day have faced additional security measures simply because they were from one of the 14 countries. But officials said they feared such broad measures did not provide an adequate filter to identify people suspected of being involved in potential terror plots.

See what happens when a smart group of people actually take time to think rigorously about a problem and then institute a proper solution?  I realize that politics can hinder or thwart such a process by forcing decision makers to take “swift action” without delay, but all too often imprudent policies are crafted without proper forethought. 

Thankfully, officials realized it this time and decided to supplant a dumb policy with a smarter one.

Is Karzai Mentally Cracking or Politically Posturing?

With Karzai’s tirade against the West yesterday, one can only wonder if the immense pressure is breaking him down mentally or if his anti-Western rants are not-so-carefully crafted, political calculations.  The latter seems like a pretty poor strategic choice for Karzai to make at such a critical juncture in his country. 

In my opinion, the incendiary, rebellious, and defensive statements reflect a mentally and politically bankrupt Karzai — who is probably no longer fit to lead. 

Karzai’s remarks, from the NY Times:

“There is no doubt that the fraud was very widespread, but this fraud was not committed by Afghans, it was committed by foreigners,” Mr. Karzai said. “This fraud was committed by Galbraith, this fraud was committed by Morillon and this fraud was committed by embassies.”

“In this situation there is a thin curtain between invasion and cooperation-assistance,” said Mr. Karzai, adding that if the perception spread that Western forces were invaders and the Afghan government their mercenaries, the insurgency “could become a national resistance.”

He further singled out The Times for criticism. “Every day my dignity as a president of this country is being attacked. The New York Times and their papers, though, they know the election was right, but on a daily basis they call me a fraudulent president in order to pressure me and put mental pressure on me,” he said.

Diplomats quietly worried about another problem: that the anger toward the West would be used by antiwar advocates in countries with troops here to bolster their arguments for withdrawal. “People will hear this and say ‘Why are we helping this man?’ ” said a Western diplomat in Kabul.

Sure, the “anti-war” advocates are riled up about Karzai, but the pragmatists and even the supporters of increasing troops in Afghanistan are probably quietly re-thinking the situation too.  Karzai is increasingly framing himself as defender of Afghanistan from the West, not militants.  And that is a major problem for US interests and COIN efforts. 

I was hopeful that Karzai could potentially champion a turn-around after the disastrous Presidential elections, assuming that he would learn from his first-term mistakes.  But its past time to face the facts and stop reluctantly accepting the “Karzai we have, not the one we want.”  It is imperative that the US has a reliable ally — not adversary — to partner against the multi-pronged insurgency.  Simply looking the other way while Karzai does what he wants, does not help the US or the Afghan people.

If we can’t get tough enough with Karzai to actually make a difference — then we unfortunately have to think honestly about our continued  involvement in Afghanistan.  Even if, for the sake of argument, everyone agrees that the mission is just, we cannot assume the desired outcome is achievable when a key component to that endgame is increasingly absent.