What if Shahzad’s Plan Succeeded?

We can all be thankful that Faisal Shahzad was incompetent enough to botch the attempted car bombing of Times Square.  Nevertheless, the Wasington Post ran an article today that highlights the endemic distrust between the US and Pakistan, which has once again become salient due to Shahzad’s probable ties to the Pakistani Taliban and other militants groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed:

U.S. allegations Sunday that Shahzad received help from Pakistani Taliban militants in the country’s northwest also seem likely to put pressure on Pakistan to launch army operations in the tribal region of North Waziristan. Until now, army leaders have resisted, partly because troops are bogged down in other anti-Taliban actions and partly because an offensive could turn friendly local fighters against the state.

Many Pakistanis have condemned the attempted bombing, saying Shahzad’s alleged actions were un-Islamic and hurt both countries. But in editorials, sermons and protests, activists have blamed the West for spotlighting Pakistan as a source of terrorism because of one incident.

The Nation newspaper, an outlet for nationalist views, declared, “It is crystal clear that the U.S. government is always behind such planted arrests.”

Some Pakistani officials have lent credence to such theories or have sought to explain the attempted attack as a reaction to U.S. policy. Interior Minister Rehman Malik said initially that before cooperating with the United States, “one has to see, is it some conspiracy against Pakistan?”

“Clinton’s statement and threatening tone will revive Pakistani fears that no matter how much we do, it won’t be enough,” said Rifaat Hussain, a professor of defense and strategic studies at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad. “Pakistan has bent over backwards to cooperate on this case. My question is, what more can we do?”

Because the US and Pakistan are close allies in the fight against Al Qaeda and its partners (even though elements within Pakistan undermine this effort) the likely response from the US following a successful terrorist attack linked back to Pakistan is hard to assess. 

Both the US and Pakistan have been punishing the TTP relentlessly for some time now.  As far as the TTP are concerned, the US and Pakistan’s interests are fully aligned.  Pakistan does not have the resources or capacity to tackle militants on so many simultaneous fronts, and there would be horrific humanitarian implications if it even attempted to do so.  So while the US continues to recite its go-to mantra for the region –”do more” — Pakistan remains bogged down and frustrated by its predicament. 

But despite the understandable capability constraints on the shoulders of Pakistan, there is still duplicitous reasoning entrenched behind its will to confront and disturb long-time strategic assets currently providing safe haven to the TTP in North Waziristan. 

Which brings me back to the original question — if Shahzad’s plan had succeeded, what would the US do?  Would there be overt boots on the ground? Increased drone strikes? An irrevocable decline in the relationship between the US and Pakistan?  On 9/11, things were a lot clearer and easier.  The attacks were traced partly back to Afghanistan — a state run largely by a hostile Taliban regime.  If a future attack does succeed and is traced back to Pakistan — a supposed friend of the US — there will still be immense pressure from the American public, lawmakers, and the media to respond swiftly and decisively, but this time things are bound to get a lot more convoluted. 

I don’t know all the answers.  But stay tuned.  Unfortunately, President Obama might have to face this grievous test during his presidency.

Building Resiliency Into Our CT Strategy

Matthew Levitt, of The Washington Institute, wrote an article today addressing one key take-away from Faisal Shahzad’s failed car bombing: the US must accept that fact that a successful terrorist attack is imminent and, as a result, we as a society must be resilient.  

A few interesting excerpts from the article:

Last weekend, a combination of good fortune and exceptional law enforcement prevented a potential tragedy in Times Square and led to the capture of the alleged attempted bomber before he could leave the country.

The startling and depressing truth is that eight years after Sept. 11, we cannot say with confidence that we are likely to prevent the next attack here. The reason is not insufficient attention, resources or effort. It’s the fact that there is no such thing as 100 percent success in counterterrorism.

The takeaway is that fortifying our defenses at home and pursuing our adversaries abroad is not enough. We must also prepare for the attacks that succeed despite our best efforts to stop them. Fostering resilience within American society is not surrendering to terrorism. Quite the opposite.

In my opinion, sheer luck and Shahzad’s technical incompetence were the only things that kept Times Square safe.  Savvy law enforcement and intelligence only became a factor after the fact — when the bomb had already failed to go off.  Since the plot was relatively simple, neither law enforcement nor intelligence services had any idea it was imminent. 

Therefore, as Levitt emphasizes, US society has to build its resiliency to terrorist attacks — both failed and successful. 

At the same time, there needs to be a clear line drawn between resiliency and a general desensitization toward the terrorist threat.  From my own limited, personal experience, there have been so many recent plots uncovered, thwarted, or failed in the US that some people are starting to not take the threat as seriously.  And that is definitely not a good thing if it means people will be less vigilant.

From a Dubious Claim to the Leading Theory: The Evolution of the TTP’s Involvement in the NYC Bomb Scare

As more information pours out of the ongoing investigation against Faisal Shahzad, it is becoming increasingly likely that a Pakistani militant group — most likely the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) aka the Pakistani Taliban — was connected in some way to the plot.  Excerpts from an article in today’s Washington Post:

Federal investigators focused Tuesday on the possible involvement of the Pakistani Taliban in the failed Times Square bombing as they pieced together clues and charged a suspect who was pulled off an airplane as he headed to his native Pakistan, according to court documents and law enforcement sources.

…told FBI agents he received bombmaking training in a region of Pakistan known as a militant hotbed. Shahzad, who became a naturalized citizen last year, is from a military family in Pakistan, where he spent five months before returning in February to his home in a leafy, quiet neighborhood of Shelton, Conn.

His reported confession, combined with a series of phone calls he received from Pakistan after purchasing the Nissan Pathfinder used in the attempted bombing, has led investigators to zero in on the Pakistani Taliban connection as “a leading theory,” a federal law enforcement official said.

The focus on a group that had been considered uninterested in launching attacks outside Pakistan or Afghanistan pointed up the gravity of an incident that authorities characterized as a potentially deadly strike against the United States, albeit with an unsophisticated homemade device that failed to detonate.

Honestly, I  would really love to meet and speak with some of the “officials” media giants such as the NY Times and Washington Post speak to on these types of issues.  Either these officials are poor analysts, speak even though they don’t have all of the information, or simply don’t know what they are talking about.  Or else, what is the explanation for why these people do a complete 180 in a matter of 24 hours?  It is not only frustrating — but scary — to think that high level officials in government explicitly discounted a plausible theory using very shoddy logical reasoning, and then turn around and proclaim that what was dubious yesterday is now the leading theory.

Sure, it could still turn out that the TTP was not directly involved in any of this.  But my frustration is based solely on the fact that supposedly knowledgable government officials would publicly dismiss something, even when  it goes against simple common sense, logic, recent history, and trends in international terrorism.

And why would the Pakistani Taliban not be interested in striking the US?  One might argue that they don’t have the operational reach (which is obviously not true if they have a willing, trained bomber with US citizenship), but subscribing to the comfortable notion that any militant Islamic group — let alone a group that we have been targeting mercilessly — would be uninterested in hitting the homeland simply because they haven’t done it before, is laughable.

Was the Failed Times Square Bombing the Work of a Lone Wolf?

Credit: NY Daily News

Early this morning, the Justice department announced the arrest of Faisal Shahzad – a US citizen of Pakistani descent — in connection with the attempted car bombing in New York City’s Times Square.  Due to the “amateurish” nature of the operation, many US officials and experts are skeptical of Shahzad’s potential affiliation with any international terrorist organization. 

Meanwhile, the Pakistani Taliban has already taken credit for the plot multiple times.  While the TTP has falsely claimed responsibility in the past, is it premature or even logical to dismiss the group’s connection outright?

Excerpts from an article in McClatchy:

The Pakistani Taliban also claimed to have been behind the botched Times Square car bombing, while Mehsud threatened more attacks.

U.S. officials, requesting anonymity to speak about an ongoing investigation, said there was no evidence to support the claim. “People are pretty skeptical” about it, one official said. Experts in Islamabad also said the Pakistani Taliban don’t have the logistical capability to stage an operation of this sort in the U.S.

The Pakistani group and its close allies have claimed responsibility for dozens of suicide bombings and other attacks in Pakistan that have killed hundreds of civilians. The group’s members, including the leadership, have little experience in the wider world.

“The (Pakistani) Taliban could provide the training, not the logistics, for attacks in the West,” said Muhammed Amir Rana, director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, an independent research organization in Islamabad. “I don’t think al Qaida would allow them to have an international reach. The Taliban are their local partner.”

 

Not to sound too flippant, but the officials and counterterrorism experts who are now skeptical of the TTP’s involvement are probably some of the same individuals who were almost positive that Hakimullah Mehsud died in a drone strike in late January.  Admittedly, I thought he was dead too.  However, I wrongly assumed that such a large number of US and Pakistani officials with access to the relevant intelligence would actually know what they were talking about. 

 

The truth is, it is far too early to dismiss or validate anything in this investigation.  However, there are still several false assumptions officials and experts continue to make repeatedly when analyzing these types of events.  First, there is the assumption that since the operation appeared  to be simplistic, it had to be the work of a lone wolf.  At this point in time, there is probably insufficient information to make that type of judgment.  How do we know there were not other car bombs  — or for that matter any other type of bombs — elsewhere in New York City that were waiting to be set off but were subsequently aborted once the Nissan was conspicuously smoking from the inside, ensuring police were on high alert? 

 

As Bruce Hoffman rightly points out in an interview with the Washington Post:

“Often officials use the word ‘amateurish,’ when in fact the attempts turn out to be more complex than first portrayed,” said Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at Georgetown University.

 

Second, as with the Underwear bomber’s Christmas Day attempt, officials have a tendency to minimize the capabilities of organizations which are not necessarily on the Intelligence Community’s high priority list or radar screens — such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula before it was determined the group carried out the attack.  Not even six months ago, officials were “skeptical” that Al Qaeda or any of its affiliates would be involved in such an “amateurish” attempt by a no-name like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.  Wrong.  Not only was Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula connected to the plot, but they indeed took credit for a failed attack just as proudly as a successful one. 

 

It would be foolish to already dismiss the plausibility that the TTP, some other terrorist organization, or even possibly (although less likely) Al Qaeda was involved in some way.  The fact that Shahzad had been in Pakistan for five months recently at the very least ensures that he had the ability to make direct contact with a plethora of militant groups operating in the country.  Sure, the TTP has virtually no experience in the world outside of Pakistan, but that doesn’t mean they couldn’t train someone who does have experience and deploy the operative to carry out a mission independently or with a small group of conspirators.  Cognizant of the prized possession that Shahzad holds — US citizenship — it would be no surprise if a terrorist group decided to capitalize on an opportunity. 

 

This last point is something I have written about at length  in several posts on this blog some time ago.  As a country, the US must appropriately address a threat which is shifting heavily from known, foreign operatives overseas toward self-motivated — but largely Af/Pak linked — citizens of Western countries. 

 

It could very well turn out that Shahzad was a complete novice, received no training, and had no affiliation with any group.  But I think the likelihood of that scenario is much lower than officials are currently promulgating, given recent history and trends in international terrorism. 

Acknowledging the Not-So-Covert CIA Drone Program

Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedmann of the New America Foundation published an interesting Op/Ed a couple days ago in the NY Times.  They argued that the CIA should come clean about its drone program, as it is already the ” world’s worst kept secret”.  Indeed, if the point of covert operations is to maintain a degree of plausible deniability, the CIA’s program has almost none. 

While I don’t necessarily have a problem with acknowledging the program, I was far from satisfied with Bergen and Tiedmann’s rationale:

But there are good reasons for the United States, which conducted 53 such strikes in 2009 alone, and Pakistan to finally acknowledge the existence of the drone program.

First, there is the matter of Pakistani civilian casualties caused by the drones. In a poll last summer, only 9 percent of Pakistanis approved of the drone strikes. A key reason for this unpopularity is the widespread perception that the strikes overwhelmingly kill civilians.

Should the American government’s claims about the small number of civilian deaths be verified, some of the Pakistani hostility toward the United States might dissipate. This would be much easier if the now-classified videotapes of drone strikes were made available to independent researchers.

True, de-classifying video tapes of drone strikes would be like Christmas for independent researchers, but I am not so sure it would significantly diminish hostility toward the US.  As documented recently with the release of the Iraq video by WikiLeaks, even if the video showed 2 civilians were killed and not 10, the powerful and visceral reactions such a video would evoke are more than enough to spark outrage and possible violence.  In short, perceptions and emotions matter much more than accurate numbers.  I can guarantee you the tribe, subtribe, and allies of a civilian victim will not care one bit if the US government was correct in their estimation of civilian casualties — and neither will many mainstream Pakistanis (and the rest of the world) who gain full access to the assassinations on their laptops. 

Acknowledging the drone program would also help advance our efforts — and improve our profile — in the region by providing an excellent example of the deepening United States-Pakistan strategic partnership. Since January 2009, up to 85 reported drone strikes have killed militants who are responsible for the deaths of thousands of Pakistanis. A good deal of the intelligence that enables these strikes comes from the Pakistanis themselves.

I am just confused by this argument.  When the Kerry-Lugar Bill was “debated” in Pakistan, there was massive outrage.  Many Pakistanis were angry that the US was giving aid to Pakistan because it was perceived as an affront to Pakistani sovereignty.  But somehow Pakistanis will celebrate a “deepening” US-Pakistani partnership that consists of using alien-like technology to kill militants and sometimes innocent civilians? 

Many Pakistanis already see the US-Pakistani relationship as too close for comfort, and using drones as the centerpiece of a strengthening partnership is not likely to do anything but further agitate the public. 

Pakistanis now believe that battling the militants is in the country’s own interest. As a result, over the past year, the public’s support for the Pakistani Army’s efforts in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan has surged. If Pakistan came clean about its involvement with the drones, public backing for the program might similarly increase.

This argument just over-simplifies  a little too much.  Pakistanis have been supportive of operations against the TTP and other militant groups that attack the state and terrorize the public.  After a much delayed response, the public and the government took ownership and responsibility of the issue and the Army has made some gains against militants with substantial public-backing.  Where does the US fit into all of this?  For the Pakistani public, nowhere.  And that’s how they like it. 

Sure, no one is going to complain if a US drone takes out Pakistani menace’s to society, Baitullah and Hakimullah Mehsud.  However, as soon as you go public with the drone program and emphasize a close partnership between the US and Pakistan against the militants, you are likely to undermine public support, increase propoganda potential for the enemy, and taint the entire effort as America’s war. 

Of course, by acknowledging the drone strikes, the Obama administration would also have to admit that civilians are sometimes killed in these attacks. When Afghan civilians are killed by American forces, their families are often compensated by the United States. Surely, the families of Pakistani civilians killed in American drone strikes deserve the same

 

This is perhaps the strongest reason the author’s had, in my opinion.  But do you really need to go public in order to compensate the families? I am not sure why that would be the only way, but I may be missing something. 

Baradar’s Capture Sparks Power Struggle

There has been much debate surrounding the implications of Mullah Baradar’s arrest in Karachi this past February.  Some argue that even when other senior leaders were caught or killed in the past, such as Mullah Dadullah, it had little or no impact on the Taliban.  Others are convinced that Baradar’s arrest is the beginning of a momentum shift in favor of the coalition forces. 

Today, The Times ran an article that depicts high-level discord in the Taliban ranks, directly fomented by Baradar’s capture. 

Two of the Taleban’s most senior military commanders are involved in a bitter power struggle, which insiders claim has split the insurgents’ leadership council and could turn violent in parts of southern Afghanistan.

Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir and Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor were both named as the successors to Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taleban’s second in command, who was arrested in Pakistan in February.

Fighters loyal to Mullah Baradar have been forced to take sides, after his arrest in Karachi. Haji Sar Mualem, the deputy head of the Marjah community shura, said that relatives told him about the tensions. “There are problems between Zakir and Mansoor,” he said. “Each of them says ‘I am the commander in Helmand’ .” Both men have supporters in Helmand, but sources said that Mullah Mansoor was trying to flood the province with fighters from his own tribe to wrest control from his rival. “He sent his soldiers to every district,” one said. “There wasn’t any fighting but it created tension.”

It would be hasty to put too much emphasis on this alleged tension within the highest echelons of the Taliban leadership, as the internal dissidence is likely to be short-lived.  Still, creating, deepening, or exploiting divisions within the enemy’s organization is definitely a positive sign — even if it is ephemeral. 

The disagreement between two senior leaders also implies that the Taliban leadership is neither uniformly nor invariably driven by ideology — power and prestige can also be a factor.  If your only goal is to expel the infidel invaders — and not gain anything personally — why bicker with your own brothers?

Furthermore, if these tensions are real and not overblown, it also says something about Mullah Omar’s authority and command and control over the group.  Either Omar was not abundantly clear about who would lead the military operations, which implies that the communication channels are poor or Omar is not an effective communicator.  Or, Omar was decisive and direct about the orders but Zakir and Mansoor are not implementing the orders correctly. 

Any way you spin it, it doesn’t look great for Taliban unity to be in potential disarray at such a critical juncture in the insurgency, which is good news for the US and its allies.

Drones and the Osama “Myth”

First of all, I apologize again for the hiatus from posting.

Yesterday, an article in the Pakistani newspaper, The Dawn, caught my attention.  Readers of this blog know I have pretty strong opinions about drone strikes and their long-term efficacy.  But in this article, I found myself defending the program. 

The fixation on Bin Laden’s capture has in fact become the cornerstone of US counter-terrorism strategy. Whether it is Predator drone attacks or targeted killings, the underlying assumption is that eliminating the leadership of Al Qaeda and the Taliban is the recipe to ridding the region of terrorist activity and achieving a victory for the United States.

To add to the saga of dwindling terrorist masterminds, the capture of a host of Al Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan leaders by Pakistani security forces has been lauded by the US as signs of crucial progress in the effort to defeat, disrupt and dismantle Al Qaeda.

The objections of defence analysts in Pakistan and elsewhere who have tried to draw attention to the possibility that simply killing the seemingly endless stream of supposed leaders may not be an effective extermination strategy has largely fallen on deaf ears among those intent on quantifying success by counting the heads of dead Al Qaeda and Taliban members.

A recent study cited in a New York Times article by Robert Wright posed this very question, and found that “leadership decapitation” is a dubious strategy at best. According to the study, published by the journal Security Studies, elimination of leaders in “religious-based” organisations such as Al Qaeda was only 17 per cent effective in actually causing the collapse of the organisation. Particularly notable is the fact that if nothing was done, the chances of the group just fading away increase to about 33 per cent.

Thus facilitated by the Osama myth, Pakistan and America’s stagnant military organisations continue to believe that the hunt, kill or capture method will eliminate the enemy. In the meantime, the organisations continue to replenish their ranks with new recruits, creating scores of new leaders to replace old ones as new Osamas and Baitullahs continue to evolve.

Zakaria makes a number of incorrect assertions about what the drone program is about and why it is perceived to be so effective. 

First, Zakaria contends that killing or capturing Osama bin Laden is the cornerstone of US counterterrorism strategy.  At best, this is debatable.  Although it is no doubt very high on the priority list, the vast majority of experts and officials involved are well aware that killing or capturing bin Laden will not mean the end of Al Qaeda.  Even experts who place greater importance on bin Laden’s influence today, such as Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, fully understand that his demise — although a tremendous blow to the organization — would not destroy the group or its ideological virus. 

Second, Zakaria asserts that successful hits on key leaders of the Pakistani Taliban or Al Qaeda are essentially meaningless.  I agree that most of the time leaders can be replaced and the organization is only temporarily shaken.  Still, although the drone strikes against leaders do little to dismantle or defeat the enemy, they do have disruptive capability.  The strikes have led to significant intra-group suspicion and forced many militants to hide in fear of being targeted.  In short, they do play some role — although a limited and short-term one — in countering terrorist groups operating in the region. 

Zakarai does, however, cite an interesting study that I admit I have not yet read.  Hopefully, I can obtain a copy of the publication and write a follow-up post outlining my thoughts on the study’s implications.

Apologize to Readers

I have been swamped this week at work and have not had time to update the blog, very sorry! I will do my best to write ASAP and will make up for my silence this week with more frequent posts when I get some more breathing space. 

Thanks!

Clear Path Out of Afghanistan?

Dr. Bernard Finel wrote a thought-provoking new piece for Foreign Affairs.  Finel often brings pragmatism and fresh analysis to  over-saturated and one-sided debates on a variety of issues, especially Afghanistan. 

He believes the US must alter its COIN approach, which would ultimately force insurgents to re-calculate their will to keep fighting and pave the way for a negotiated, compromised peace-plan.  Excerpts from the article, published today:

On the other hand, a robust enemy-centric COIN campaign to eliminate insurgent strongholds and reduce their combat power would make an insurgent victory unlikely. Once both the insurgents and NATO forces acknowledge this reality, they will be left to haggle over the details of what comes next.

To convince senior insurgent leaders to compromise, Washington will have to keep consistent pressure on insurgent strongholds.

The logic of an enemy-centric COIN campaign is not to hold territory but to demonstrate that the insurgents cannot hold territory either.

I whole-heartedly agree with the emphasis on inducing formal negotiations and acknowledging that their must be some kind of a compromise.  There will be no unconditional surrenders.  I am not convinced, however, that an enemy-centric COIN strategy will foster the conditions necessary or sufficiently break the insurgent’s will to keep fighting. 

First, an underlying assumption is that the insurgents actually believe they can hold contested territory in the first place.  In several instances, NATO operations into insurgent strongholds have led to the militants simply scattering, far from putting up the type of fight one would expect from a group that thinks it can withstand the onslaught.  I think the insurgents already know it’s extremely difficult from them to hold territory when it is actually contested.  Thus, they often choose to withdraw and move to another area — only to return if and when international forces fail to hold the territory they were displaced from.  In other words, further demonstrating to insurgent’s that they cannot hold territory does not seem like it would yield a fundamentally different strategic calculation if they are indeed fully aware of that fact already. 

Second, Finel does not explain how exactly this enemy-centric strategy would play out operationally.  To me, it sounds like a giant wack-a-mole strategy in which international troops sweep through one insurgent stronghold — possibly resulting in significant collateral damage that perpetuates more violence  – and then proceed to the next insurgent stronghold, leaving the one they just cleared open for re-infiltration.  Sure, the insurgents might get tired of trying to establish themselves in key strategic areas if they keep getting kicked out, but our troops will likely be just as tired of playing cat and mouse.  More importantly, the people of theses areas will be the real victims. 

Admittedly, as Finel mentions, McChrystal may be advocating a population-centric approach yet is equally concentrating on going after the enemy in areas where its influence is the greatest.  I don’t see a problem or contradiction with that. 

Where I see a potential issue is if our troops fail to hold any of the territory they capture, allowing insurgents to return and repeating the cycle endlessly. 

Finally, if the goal is to encourage a negotiated solution, it’s not clear that we need to shift our strategy at all.  Already — and apparently as far back as two-plus years ago — there is mounting evidence that senior leaders of the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami are and have been responding to overtures from the Afghan government and the UN.  Consequently, it may be more appropriate for the US not to change its military strategy, but to alter its mindset about the efficacy of negotiations with leaders of the insurgency.

Drone Strikes Force Al Qaeda to Give Up Luxuries

Yet another NY Times article trumpeting the effectiveness of drone strikes in Pakistan was published yesterday, underscoring just how in infatuated some reporters and analysts are with the strikes.  Excerpts from the Times:

The strikes have cast a pall of fear over an area that was once a free zone for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, forcing militants to abandon satellite phones and large gatherings in favor of communicating by courier and moving stealthily in small groups, they said.

Militants now sneak into villages two at a time to sleep, he said. Some homeowners were refusing to rent space to Arabs, who are associated with Al Qaeda, for fear of their families’ being killed by the drones, he said.

The militants have abandoned all-terrain vehicles in favor of humdrum public transportation, one of the government supporters said.

The army maintains a division of soldiers in North Waziristan, but, the militant said, the Pakistani soldiers do little to hinder militant operations, which, though under greater pressure from the drones, have by no means stopped.

Indeed, relentless pressure from drone strikes have ensured that militants in the Tribal Areas cannot pre-order the new iPhone.  And thus, we are winning.

Communicating via courier and moving “stealthily” in small groups may sound painfully extreme to the average American, but these militants are operating in a society in which the standard of living and atmosphere are more comparable to 1810, not 2010.  Sure, they would love to use satellite phones and drive around Miramshah in the sleakest 1989 Toyota 4 x 4 on the block, but these are luxuries and not necessarily necessities for Al Qaeda to sufficiently operate.

Sure, hampering Al Qaeda’s communication channels and thereby slowing the flow of their information networks is very important.  If the strikes are assisting in that, that is a great sign.  Furthermore, if the strikes are sowing fear and insecurity within and between militant groups and support networks, that is also excellent news.

But Al Qaeda still continues on with its core functions, despite the heavy onslaught by drones.  The pace of successful strikes against Al Qaeda leaders is still slower than necessary to significantly undermine its ability to replace fallen militants and maintain a solid chain of command.  In other words, Al Qaeda, while admittedly under substantial pressure, has simply adapted and modified the manner in which it executes its core functions — but they have not ceased.

It’s a much more dangerous environment for Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.  But to put this in some context, Al Qaeda had been operating (albeit cautiously and surreptitiously) from 2001 until just a few years ago with near impunity, except for sporadic operations by Pakistan.  Al Qaeda militants were gradually re-grouping and increasing strength for several years and now they must hide.  That is certainly progress, no doubt about that.

However, a key issue is something that was only mentioned as an aside in the article: Pakistan’s Army has a division stationed in North Waziristan and militants don’t seem to be the slightest bit afraid.  Couple the strikes with a broader counterterrorism strategy in North Waziristan, and the results will drastically overshadow current successes.   But without a more comprehensive approach, Al Qaeda will continue to plan, plot, and execute.